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A PROGRESSIVE STATE OF MIND:
NEW YORK’S OPPORTUNITY TO RECLAIM
JUSTICE FOR ITS JUVENILES
Julianne T. Scarpino*
Though New York State was once progressive in its approach
to juvenile justice, it is now one of only two states clinging to an
archaic age of criminal responsibility: sixteen years old. In
addition, New York’s thirteen-, fourteen-, and fifteen-year-olds are
prosecuted as adults if they commit designated felonies. Adult
prosecution and incarceration of juveniles harms both the child
and society. Recent developments in brain imaging demonstrate
that juveniles are both less culpable than adults and more
receptive to rehabilitative intervention. In New York, this
opportunity to rehabilitate is squandered. Juveniles incarcerated
in adult facilities have limited access to educational and
rehabilitative programs and are at high risk for sexual
victimization, depression, and criminal socialization. Moreover,
empirical studies of juveniles sentenced as adults conclude that
adult sentencing has no deterrent effect on juvenile crime.
Proposed legislation, the youth court pilot program, and
recommendations from the Governor’s Commission are
progressive steps to dismantling New York’s outdated juvenile
justice system, but they fall short by denying assistance to New
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York’s most troubled juveniles. This Note advocates four changes
to the New York criminal justice system. First, the age of criminal
responsibility in New York should be raised to eighteen. Second,
New York should establish a separate youth court to adjudicate all
cases involving sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds, and all
designated felonies committed by thirteen-, fourteen-, and fifteenyear-olds. Third, New York should eliminate any provisions
permitting the transfer of juveniles from family court to adult
criminal court. Fourth, district attorneys and judges should have
discretion to authorize waiver from criminal court to youth court
for select cases involving eighteen- to twenty-one-year-olds. It is
time for New York to raise the age of criminal responsibility and
embrace rehabilitative intervention for all juveniles, regardless of
the offense.
INTRODUCTION
“There is no denying the fact that we cannot write
these children off forever. Some day they will grow
up and at some point they will have to be freed from
incarceration . . . and the kind of society we have in
the years to come will in no small measure depend
upon our treatment of them now.”1
Rikers Island is situated in the middle of the East River—out of
sight, mind, and earshot of most New Yorkers.2 Though its inmates
are generally unseen and unheard, former teen inmate Ismael
Nazario can confirm that the juveniles incarcerated at Rikers and
the screams they bellow from their cells are quite real.3 Rikers is a
1

Rose M. Charles & Jennifer V. Zuccarelli, Note, Serving No “Purpose”:
The Double-Edged Sword of New York’s Juvenile Offender Law, 12 ST. JOHN’S
J. LEGAL COMM. 721, 743 (1997) (quoting United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d
1329, 1349 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Wright, J., dissenting)).
2
See Culture of Violence Pervades Rikers’ Juvenile Facilities (National
Public Radio Oct. 15, 2014), transcript available at http://www.npr.org/
templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=356165968.
3
Amelia Pang, This is New York: Gabrielle Horowitz-Prisco, Director of
Juvenile Justice Project on Protecting Children, EPOCH TIMES (Aug. 30, 2014),
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city jail for adult inmates, and the majority of its prisoners are kept
there pending the resolution of their cases.4 In New York,
however, the term “adult” can be misleading. New York is one of
only two states5 that automatically prosecute sixteen- and
seventeen-year-olds as adults, and adult criminal court retains
original jurisdiction over juveniles as young as thirteen who
commit designated felony acts.6
At age sixteen, Ismael was arrested for assault and incarcerated
at Rikers pending the resolution of his criminal case.7 Most often,
the source of Ismael’s and his fellow inmates’ agony was their
time in solitary confinement8—a form of isolated imprisonment
where the inmate spends twenty-three hours per day in a six-byeight foot cell and one hour per day in a cage outdoors.9 While
incarcerated, Ismael spent more than 300 days in solitary
confinement.10 Ismael, reflecting on his time at Rikers, recalled the
screams of fellow inmates and the times he lent his voice to their
http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/923273-this-is-new-york-gabrielle-horowitzprisco-director-of-juvenile-justice-project-on-protecting-children/print.php.
4
See Trey Bundy, For Teens at Rikers Island Solitary Confinement Pushes
Mental Limits, CTR. FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING (Mar. 4, 2014),
http://cironline.org/reports/teens-rikers-island-solitary-confinement-pushesmental-limits-6130.
5
North Carolina is the only other state that automatically prosecutes
sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds as adults. Michael A. Corriero, Judging
Children as Children: Reclaiming New York’s Progressive Tradition, 56 N.Y.L.
S CH . L. R EV . 1413, 1415 (2012).
6
See Charles & Zuccarelli, supra note 1, at 739; Stephen A. Newman,
Foreword: The Past, Present, and Future of Juvenile Justice Reform in New
York State, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1263, 1264 (2012); Get the Facts, RAISE THE
AGE NY, http://raisetheageny.com/get-the-facts (last visited Feb. 20, 2015). A
designated felony act is defined as “an act which, if done by an adult, would be a
crime.” N.Y. F AM . C T . A CT . § 301.2(8) (McKinney 2014). A non-exhaustive
list of these acts includes murder, kidnapping, arson, rape, and assault. Id.
7
Bundy, supra note 4; Culture of Violence Pervades Rikers’ Juvenile
Facilities, supra note 2.
8
Bundy, supra note 4.
9
Michael Winerip & Michael Schwirtz, Rikers to Ban Isolation for Inmates
21 and Younger, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/
01/14/nyregion/new-york-city-to-end-solitary-confinement-for-inmates-21-andunder-at-rikers.html?_r=0.
10
Bundy, supra note 4.

848

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

communal cry.11 According to Ismael, teenagers desperate to avoid
solitary confinement engaged in potentially life-threatening
conduct, such as placing “AA batteries in their rectums.”12 This,
and any other act considered suicidal, resulted in temporary
ineligibility for solitary confinement.13 Although solitary
confinement was an agonizing form of punishment for Ismael and
similarly situated juveniles at Rikers, this form of abuse was but
one of a myriad of issues for juveniles incarcerated at adult
facilities.14
After years of criticism, in 2014 the New York City
Department of Correction eliminated the use of solitary
confinement for sixteen- and seventeen-year-old inmates.15
Though these juveniles are no longer subjected to the rigors of
solitary confinement, youth advocates argue that this change masks
the true problem: “New York’s adult criminal justice system,
including every county jail and adult correctional facility, is no
place for children and youths.”16
Proponents of raising New York’s age of criminal
responsibility argue that the prosecution of juveniles as adults has
crippled a segment of the juvenile population and produced
disastrous results for both the offenders and society as a whole.17
New York prosecutes annually approximately 40,000–50,000

11

Id.
Id.
13
Id.
14
See generally Tamar Birckhead, Op-Ed., The Solitary Confinement of
Youth, JUVENILE JUSTICE INFO. EXCH. (Sep. 23, 2014), http://jjie.org/op-ed-thesolitary-confinement-of-youth/. While incarcerated at Rikers, Ismael was
“attacked by four inmates who demanded his phone privileges and food
commissary and required him to ask their permission before sitting in a chair or
using a bathroom.” Id.
15
Winerip & Schwirtz, supra note 9. On January 10, 2015, the New York
City Board of Corrections approved a plan to eliminate solitary confinement for
all inmates twenty-one years old and younger. Id. The policy change would take
effect in 2016, but is contingent on funding. Id.
16
Jennifer March, Letter to the Editor, Keeping Youths Out of Adult
Prisons, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/
08/07/opinion/keeping-youths-out-of-adult-prisons.html.
17
See, e.g., Get the Facts, supra note 6.
12
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sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds as adults.18 Juveniles incarcerated
in adult facilities are “five times more likely to be sexually
assaulted”19 and “thirty-six times more likely to commit suicide”
than juveniles in juvenile detention facilities.20 While juvenile
detention facilities offer rehabilitative and educational programs to
support detainees, adult facilities have limited access to ageappropriate mental health, physical health, and educational
services for the juveniles incarcerated there.21 In addition, unlike
family court adjudication for juveniles, criminal court adjudication
affords no automatic sealing provision.22 If processed in criminal
court, designation as a Youthful Offender is a juvenile’s only
opportunity for a sealed record.23 Should these juveniles emerge
from adult incarceration and attempt to become productive
members of society, the stigma of a criminal record creates
significant barriers to education, employment, and housing.24
18

WARREN A. REICH ET AL., CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE RESPONSE TO 16- AND 17-YEAR-OLD DEFENDANTS IN NEW YORK 2
(June 2014), available at http://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/
documents/ADP%20Y2%20Report%20Final%20_v2.pdf.
19
Prison Rape Elimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 15601(4) (2003).
20
CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, JAILING JUVENILES: THE DANGERS OF
INCARCERATING YOUTH IN ADULT JAILS IN AMERICA 10 (November 2007)
[hereinafter JAILING JUVENILES], available at http://www.campaignfor
youthjustice.org/documents/CFYJNR_JailingJuveniles.pdf.
21
Andrea Wood, Comment, Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Confining
Juveniles with Adults After Graham and Miller, 61 EMORY L.J. 1445, 1454
(2012).
22
Lisa Schreibersdorf, Bringing the Best of Both Worlds:
Recommendations for Criminal Justice Reform for Older Adolescents, 35
CARDOZO L. REV. 1143, 1146 (2014); FINAL REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR’S
COMMISSION ON YOUTH, PUBLIC SAFETY, AND JUSTICE: RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM IN NEW YORK STATE 3 (2015) [hereinafter
GOV.’S COMM’N RECOMMENDATIONS FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM],
available at https://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/governor.ny.gov/files/atoms/
files/ReportofCommissiononYouthPublicSafetyandJustice_0.pdf.
23
GOV.’S COMM’N RECOMMENDATIONS FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM,
supra note 22, at 3.
24
Corriero, supra note 5, at 1419–22. This Note does not suggest that
juveniles incarcerated in juvenile facilities face no barriers to education,
employment, or housing post-incarceration. Rather, this Note argues that those
barriers are heightened by adult incarceration.
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Recent Supreme Court decisions have held that juveniles are
constitutionally distinct from adults for sentencing purposes
because of their immaturity, recklessness, and impulsivity.25
Moreover, developments in brain imaging demonstrate that brain
development continues into adulthood.26 Juvenile brains are more
active than adult brains in regions controlling aggression and fear,
and less active than adult brains in regions associated with risk
assessment and impulse control.27 This research suggests that
juveniles are not only less culpable than adults, but more receptive
to rehabilitative intervention.28 Though juveniles are physically,
psychologically, and constitutionally different from adults, New
York’s criminal justice system fails to account for these
differences. As a result, New York’s children suffer.
To rectify New York’s treatment of young offenders, this Note
argues for four changes to the New York criminal justice system.
First, the age of criminal responsibility in New York should be
raised to eighteen. Second, New York should establish a separate
youth court to adjudicate all cases involving sixteen- and
seventeen-year-olds, and all designated felonies committed by
thirteen-, fourteen-, and fifteen-year-olds. Third, New York should
eliminate any provisions permitting the transfer of juveniles from
family court to adult criminal court. Finally, district attorneys and
judges should have discretion to authorize waiver from criminal
court to youth court for select cases involving eighteen- to twentyone-year-olds.
This Note proceeds in five parts. Part I provides a brief history
of the juvenile justice system in New York and the evolution of
New York’s juvenile offender laws. Part II analyzes and compares
New York’s juvenile and adult criminal systems. Part III examines
scientific research regarding juvenile brain development and the
negative consequences of prosecuting juveniles as adults, and
concludes that raising the age of criminal responsibility in New
25

See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012); Graham v. Florida,
560 U.S. 48, 81 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
26
Brief of the American Medical Association et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005) (No. 03633), 2004 WL 1633549, at *12 [hereinafter AMA Brief].
27
Id.
28
See Get the Facts, supra note 6.
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York will better serve youth offenders and the community. Part IV
examines and critiques current proposals for augmenting New
York’s juvenile justice system. Part V puts forth the alternative
recommendations to both laws and procedures described above.
This Note does not suggest that juveniles should not be held
accountable for their actions. Rather, it proposes investing
resources in rehabilitative and deterrent measures designed
specifically for youth offenders. New York prosecutes and
incarcerates juveniles at a time in their lives when they are most
susceptible to rehabilitative intervention. Under the current
paradigm, the State misses the precious opportunity to turn
troubled teens into productive members of society.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM

OF

NEW

YORK

STATE’S

New York’s juvenile justice system has evolved significantly
from its nineteenth century origins.29 Once a leader in
rehabilitative justice,30 New York exchanged its progressive
policies for punishment-based reform.31 The efficacy of these
reforms is now called into question, as brain imaging and
sociological research suggests that New York’s retributive system
is failing its juveniles.32
A. Rehabilitative Origins
Though New York’s early juvenile justice system often fell
short of its rehabilitative aims,33 its founding principles have
reemerged
in
contemporary
juvenile
justice
reform

29

See Alison Marie Grinnell, Note & Comment, Searching for a Solution:
The Future of New York’s Juvenile Offender Law, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
635, 666–67 (2000).
30
Jellisa Joseph, Note, Catching Up: How the Youth Court Act Can Save
New York State’s Outdated Juvenile Justice System with Regard to Sixteen and
Seventeen-Year-Old Offenders, 7 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 219, 222 (2014).
31
See Grinnell, supra note 29, at 667.
32
See Get the Facts, supra note 6.
33
See Grinnell, supra note 29, at 639.
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recommendations.34 “[T]he reform and rehabilitation of New York
children who have engaged in criminal activity—and their
segregation from adult transgressors—dates from the early
nineteenth century.”35 In 1824, New York State formed the New
York House of Refuge to offer juveniles rehabilitative treatment
outside of the adult incarceration system.36 New York founded the
House of Refuge on the premise that juveniles required specialized
treatment and could be rehabilitated through discipline and
education.37 This emphasis on juvenile rehabilitation was
progressive; the facility was the first juvenile reformatory in the
nation.38 Though the House of Refuge was “[p]artly modeled upon
the then new adult penitentiary system, children, unlike adults,
received indeterminate sentences, which could remain in effect
until age twenty-one.”39 By 1846, male offenders under age
eighteen and female offenders under age seventeen were precluded
from adult incarceration. Thus, at its early stages, New York’s
juvenile justice reform “prohibited the imprisonment of sixteen and
seventeen year old children, an achievement which has eluded this
state throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.”40 The
New York House of Refuge operated for 110 years, closing in
1935 when the Society for the Reformation of Juvenile
Delinquents in New York City dissolved.41
34

See Katharine Lazarow, Note, The Continued Viability of New York’s
Juvenile Offender Act in Light of Recent National Developments, 57 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 595, 616 (2013).
35
Merril Sobie, Pity the Child: The Age of Delinquency in New York, 30
PACE L. REV. 1061, 1066 (2010) [hereinafter Sobie, Pity the Child].
36
Jordan K. Hummel, Note, The Bitter Side of Sweet Sixteen: Why New
York Should Amend Its Juvenile Transfer Laws, 27 J. CIV. RTS. & ECON. DEV.
261, 269 (2014).
37
Joseph, supra note 30. Despite its rehabilitative premise, the New York
House of Refuge received criticism for its use of retributive measures, such as
physical abuse and solitary confinement. Grinnell, supra note 29, at 639.
38
Joseph, supra note 30.
39
Merril Sobie, Family Court–A Short History, 1 Jud. Notice 6 (2011)
[hereinafter Sobie, Family Court], available at http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/
lawfaculty/858/.
40
Sobie, Pity the Child, supra note 35, at 1067.
41
The Greatest Reform School in the World: A Guide to the Records of the
New York House of Refuge, N.Y. State Archives 6 (1989), available at
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In 1902, New York County created a specialized juvenile
court, tasked with adjudicating juvenile cases for offenders under
age sixteen.42 This court was a division of the adult criminal court
system and utilized the same judicial proceedings.43 The New York
State Legislature decriminalized most juvenile offenses in 1909.44
When the legislature realized that juveniles required further
distinct treatment from adults, New York created an independent
juvenile court—the New York State Children’s Court—in 1922.45
Juveniles younger than sixteen “were within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Children’s Court.”46 The Children’s Court’s
jurisdiction excluded juveniles charged with capital offenses or
offenses punishable by life imprisonment, as well as all juveniles
over fifteen.47 The Children’s Court’s low jurisdictional age limit
garnered criticism almost immediately—criticism that has
continued for close to a century.48 Despite numerous legislative
attempts to raise the age of criminal responsibility,49 the New York
State Legislature has consistently “tabled the issue for future
review.”50
In establishing the Children’s Court, “[s]aving the child had
become the paramount consideration—the underlying conduct,
criminal or non-criminal . . . was viewed merely as symptomatic or
as one consideration in formulating a rehabilitative prescription.”51
http://www.archives.nysed.gov/a/research/res_topics_ed_reform.pdf.
42
Grinnell, supra note 29, at 639.
43
Id.
44
GOV.’S COMM’N RECOMMENDATIONS FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM,
supra note 22, at 3.
45
Merril Sobie, The Juvenile Offender Act: Effectiveness and Impact on the
Juvenile Justice System, 26 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 677, 682 (1981).
46
Grinnell, supra note 29, at 640.
47
Id.
48
Hummel, supra note 36, at 270.
49
These legislative attempts include the 1942 Joint Legislative Committee
on Children’s Court Jurisdiction and Juvenile Delinquency, the 1961 New York
Constitutional Convention, the 1978 Juvenile Offender Law, the 2012 New
York Senate Bill 7394, and the 2012 New York Senate Bill 7020. Hummel,
supra note 36, at 270; Joseph, supra note 30, at 238–39.
50
Hummel, supra note 36, at 270; Joseph, supra note 30, at 238–39.
51
MERRIL SOBIE, THE CREATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF NEW
YORK’S CHILDREN’S LAWS 176 (1987).
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The court assumed a parens patriae role.52 Judges were given wide
discretion to impose indeterminate sentences that could remain in
effect until the juvenile reached the age of majority.53 In electing to
separate juvenile and adult criminal offenders, “juvenile courts
rejected both the criminal law’s jurisprudence and its procedural
safeguards.”54 For example, the Children’s Court initially utilized
both jury trials and the reasonable doubt standard for determining
delinquency.55 However, as early as the 1930s the court relaxed
these procedural safeguards, deeming them unnecessary in light of
the aim to treat rather than punish the child.56 The right to an
attorney,57 jury trials, and the right against self-incrimination were
thus eliminated.58
The 1961 New York State Constitutional Convention dissolved
the Children’s Court and reorganized the juvenile court system.59
The 1962 Family Court Act replaced the Children’s Court.60 The
Family Court Act “created a uniform court system, granting
jurisdiction to family courts to handle cases involving ‘every
symptom of familial dysfunction,’ including, but not limited to
child neglect, juvenile delinquency, intra-family violence, and
paternity suits.”61 The Family Court Act “incorporated several
landmark provisions” and procedural safeguards that the
Children’s Court lacked: children were assigned counsel, permitted
to conduct discovery, introduce evidence, and appeal adverse

52

Barry C. Feld, Juvenile and Criminal Justice Systems’ Responses to
Youth Violence, 24 CRIME & JUST. 189, 192 (1998). Parens patriae, Latin for
“parent of his or her country,” refers to the state’s capacity to protect those
unable to care for themselves. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1287 (10th ed. 2014).
53
Feld, supra note 52, at 193.
54
Id. at 192.
55
Grinnell, supra note 29, at 640.
56
Id. at 640–41.
57
Feld, supra note 52, at 192.
58
Grinnell, supra note 29, at 640–41.
59
GOV.’S COMM’N RECOMMENDATIONS FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM,
supra note 22, at 4.
60
Id.
61
Ashley A. Hughes, The Evolution of Youth as an Excuse: Striking a
Balance Between the Interest of Public Safety and the Principle That Kids Are
Kids, 29 TOURO L. REV. 967, 994 (2013).
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decisions.62 Additional family court protections included the
potential for complete disposition of a case following probation, no
mandatory sentencing requirements, and sealed juvenile records.63
Family court retained exclusive jurisdiction over children at least
seven years old and less than sixteen years old, unless the child
was fifteen years or older and charged with an offense punishable
by death or life imprisonment.64 However, under the 1962 Family
Court Act, a criminal court judge could waive into family court a
juvenile who was fifteen years old or older if he had been charged
with a capital or life-imprisonment offense.65
B. Retributive Juvenile Justice Reform
Though the Children’s Court and the 1962 Family Court Act
laid a rehabilitative foundation for New York’s juvenile justice
system,66 increases in juvenile crime during the 1970s67 sparked a
wave of retributive reform.68 Media outlets and politicians
sensationalized the surge in violence, attributing it to various
factors, including the crack epidemic, gang violence, and gun
accessibility.69 Reacting to mounting public pressure for more
stringent juvenile punishments,70 the New York State Legislature
adopted the Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1976.71 The 1976 Act
62

Sobie, Family Court, supra note 39, at 7.
Hughes, supra note 61, at 995.
64
Grinnell, supra note 29, at 641.
65
Id.
66
See Hughes, supra note 61, at 994.
67
See Lazarow, supra note 34, at 596 n.2.
68
See GOV.’S COMM’N RECOMMENDATIONS FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE
REFORM, supra note 22, at 4–5.
69
Lazarow, supra note 34, at 602.
70
“Media hype surrounding isolated incidents of excessive juvenile
violence and predictions of a coming wave of super-predators and fledgling
psychopaths hastened this philosophical shift by arousing public alarm and
serving as the platform for politicians to compete to demonstrate that they aimed
to get tough on crime.” Michael J. Ritter, Just (Juvenile Justice) Jargon: An
Argument for Terminological Uniformity Between the Juvenile and Criminal
Justice Systems, 37 AM. J. CRIM. L. 221, 228–29 (2010) (internal quotation
marks, alterations, and citations omitted).
71
Michelle Haddad, Note, Catching Up: The Need for New York State To
63
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amended the purpose of the Family Court Act to balance the needs
of juveniles against the consideration for community safety.72
The inclusion of a community interest provision in the Family
Court Act’s purpose signaled “a sharp philosophical change from
the concept of individualized justice based solely on the needs and
interests of the child.”73 In furtherance of protecting community
interests, the 1976 Juvenile Justice Reform Act created a “new
category of delinquency”—“designated felony”—for certain
violent crimes, including robbery and homicide.74 Children ages
fourteen and fifteen charged with the commission of a designated
felony were eligible for harsher punishments, such as restrictive
confinement for three to five years.75 Though the 1976 Act
provided for harsher penalties, its overall tenor remained rooted in
juvenile treatment and rehabilitation.76 The 1976 Act was
unexpectedly short lived—a mere two years later the
sensationalized crimes of one New York juvenile would precipitate
sweeping juvenile justice reform.77
In March of 1978, a fifteen-year-old New York boy committed
a series of violent crimes that ignited a “national wave in favor of
mandating transfer to adult criminal court for violent young
offenders.”78 On a subway approaching Yankee Stadium, fifteenyear-old Willie Bosket79 shot a sleeping man twice in the head.80
Amend Its Juvenile Offender Law To Reflect Psychiatric, Constitutional and
Normative National Trends Over the Last Three Decades, 7 CARDOZO PUB. L.
POL’Y & ETHICS J. 455, 458 (2009).
72
N.Y. F AM . C T . A CT § 301.1 (McKinney 2014) (“In any proceeding
under this article, the court shall consider the needs and best interests of the
respondent as well as the need for protection of the community.”).
73
SOBIE, supra note 51, at 169.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Haddad, supra note 71, at 459–60.
77
See id. at 457–60; GOV.’S COMM’N RECOMMENDATIONS FOR JUVENILE
JUSTICE REFORM, supra note 22, at 5.
78
Eric K. Klein, Note, Dennis the Menace or Billy the Kid: An Analysis of
the Role of Transfer To Criminal Court in Juvenile Justice, 35 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 371, 383 (1998).
79

An interesting and disturbing fact of Willie Bosket’s life
history is that he had, for a bulk of his childhood, been the
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Bosket removed a ring and a watch from the man’s hand, fifteen
dollars from the man’s pocket, and then left the scene of the
crime.81 Less than one week later, Bosket shot and killed a second
subway passenger and injured a train yard dispatcher.82 The
murders and subsequent trial were highly publicized,83 and the
media referred to Bosket as “the Baby-Faced Butcher.”84 Due to
Bosket’s age, his case was adjudicated in a Bronx family court,
where he was found guilty of both murders.85 In accordance with
the 1976 Juvenile Justice Reform Act, Bosket received the
maximum penalty for his crimes: five years of incarceration at a
juvenile facility, with no permanent criminal record.86
Unsurprisingly, the resulting public outcry for “tough on
crime” legislation was heeded in that gubernatorial election year.87
victim of severe physical and sexual abuse and spent a great
deal of time in the custody of New York’s juvenile justice
system for committing minor crimes. Despite having been
confined to their care, almost every opportunity to rehabilitate
him and address his needs was missed.
Travis Johnson, All Children Are Created Equal Too: The Disparate Treatment
of Youth Rights in America, 15 CUNY L. REV. 173, 182 (2011).
80
Haddad, supra note 71, at 456.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Klein, supra note 78, at 383–84.
85
Haddad, supra note 71, at 456.
86
Johnson, supra note 79, at 182. Just three months after his release from
the juvenile facility, Bosket was arrested for attempted robbery and assault.
Haddad, supra note 71, at 456 n.4. During his incarceration Bosket earned two
more convictions, resulting in a sentence of twenty-five years to life
imprisonment. Id. While serving this sentence, Bosket stabbed a prison guard in
the chest, resulting in a conviction for attempted murder. Id. Between 1985 and
1994, Bosket received more than 250 disciplinary violations. John Eligon, Two
Decades in Solitary, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/
2008/09/23/nyregion/23inmate.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. In 1994, Bosket
was relegated to solitary confinement, and is eligible to rejoin the general prison
population in 2046. Id.
87
See Johnson, supra note 79, at 182; Michael A. Corriero, with Alison M.
Hamanjian, Advancing Juvenile Justice Reform in New York A Proposed Model,
80 N.Y. ST. B.J. 20, 21 (2008) (“In 1978, an extraordinary case of juvenile
violence, a gubernatorial election and public frustration with the juvenile justice
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Just two weeks after Bosket’s sentencing, New York Governor
Hugh Carey opened a special legislative session,88 which
evidenced “the legislature’s outraged state of mind and thirst for
retribution.”89 A few months later, the New York State Legislature
adopted the 1978 Juvenile Offender Act, which remains in effect
today.90
The 1978 Act lowered the age of criminality from sixteen to
thirteen for the most serious violent offenses.91 The New York
State Legislature vested criminal court, as opposed to family court,
with original jurisdiction over thirteen-year-olds charged with
second degree murder or a sexually motivated felony, and
fourteen- and fifteen-year-olds charged with second degree
murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, arson, assault, rape, criminal
sexual act, aggravated sexual abuse, burglary, robbery, possession
of a firearm on school grounds, attempted murder, attempted
kidnapping, or a sexually motivated felony.92 The 1978 Act
designated the term Juvenile Offender to describe these thirteen-,
fourteen-, and fifteen-year-olds.93
Under the 1978 Act, Juvenile Offenders are treated as adults at
arrest and prosecuted in criminal court.94 Waiver of Juvenile
Offenders to family court is possible, but occurs only at the
discretion of the district attorney or judge.95 Under New York
Penal law, the sentencing ranges for Juvenile Offenders in criminal
court occupy the middle of a spectrum—available sentence ranges
are “less severe than for adults but more severe than those
system resulted in enactment of New York’s Juvenile Offender Law.”).
88
Lazarow, supra note 34, at 603.
89
Haddad, supra note 71, at 464. Notably, after approving the 1976
Juvenile Reform Act, Governor Carey publicly discussed his support of the
Legislature’s decision to rehabilitate juvenile offenders outside of the adult
criminal justice system. Id. at 463.
90
Id. at 457.
91
Hummel, supra note 36, at 271–72; Grinnell, supra note 29, at 643.
92
N.Y. P ENAL L AW § 10.00(18) (McKinney 2014); Charles & Zuccarelli,
supra note 1, at 739–40.
93
GOV.’S COMM’N RECOMMENDATIONS FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM,
supra note 22, at 5.
94
Id.
95
Hummel, supra note 36, at 272.
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available for juveniles convicted of [designated felony acts] in
Family Court.”96
The 1978 Juvenile Offender Act not only lowered the age of
criminal responsibility, but increased mandatory sentences for
violent offenders, required mandatory incarceration for certain
violent crimes, and restricted the plea bargaining process for all
violent offenders.97 Under the 1978 Act, if a juvenile is prosecuted
in criminal court, his only means of avoiding a permanent felony
record is designation as a “Youthful Offender.”98 Youthful
Offender treatment seals all related records,99 but may be granted
via judicial discretion only in limited circumstances.100 Moreover,
even though a grant of Youthful Offender status may seal a
juvenile’s record, he is still required to navigate the adult
adversarial court system, where retributive sanctions take
precedent over rehabilitative ones.101
New York State was not alone in adopting tough-on-juvenilecrime policies. “Anxious to establish their crime control
credentials, politicians across the country turned untested ideas
into guiding principles and promulgated criminal and juvenile
justice policies without any attention to whether the promised
96

GOV.’S COMM’N RECOMMENDATIONS FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM,
supra note 22, at 5.
97
Haddad, supra note 71, at 460.
98
Id. at 462.
99
Hummel, supra note 36, at 272.
100
N.Y. C RIM . P ROC . L AW § 720.10 (McKinney 2014). Adolescents
accused of murder, armed felonies, or sex crimes are ineligible for Youthful
Offender Status, unless
[T]he court determines that one or more of the following
factors exist: (i) mitigating circumstances that bear directly
upon the manner in which the crime was committed; or (ii)
where the defendant was not the sole participant in the crime,
the defendant’s participation was relatively minor although not
so minor as to constitute a defense to the prosecution.
Id. In determining whether to grant Youthful Offender status, the court balances
“the nature of the offense, whether the victim suffered any physical injuries, the
defendant’s role in the offense, the defendant’s prior criminal history, as well as
the recommendations of both the prosecutor and defense counsel.” Grinnell,
supra note 29, at 647–48.
101
Haddad, supra note 71, at 462.
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outcomes would ever occur.”102 Between 1970 and 1990, forty
jurisdictions reduced the minimum age for criminal prosecutions,
twelve states eliminated the minimum age requirement for the
transfer of juveniles into adult criminal court, and Congress
expanded the number of federal crimes with which a juvenile could
be charged.103 Though tough-on-juvenile-crime reforms swept the
nation,104 New York retains the lowest age of criminal
responsibility, joined only by North Carolina.105
II. COMPARING THE ADULT
SYSTEMS IN NEW YORK

AND

JUVENILE CRIMINAL JUSTICE

Rehabilitation, deterrence, and in extreme cases, incapacitation,
serve as the philosophical foundations of New York’s juvenile
justice system.106 The adult criminal justice system varies by
degree—it is less rehabilitative and more punitive than the juvenile
system, exemplified by harsher sentences, fewer educational
opportunities for incarcerated persons, and harsher incarceration
conditions.107
Family court has original jurisdiction over Persons In Need Of
Supervision (PINS) and Juvenile Delinquents.108 The term PINS
denotes a status offender younger than eighteen who is processed
for non-criminal behavior.109 The term Juvenile Delinquent
denotes a child from seven to fifteen years old who commits an
offense that would be criminal if the child were over age fifteen.110
Criminal court, as opposed to family court, has original jurisdiction
102

Kim Taylor-Thompson, Minority Rule: Redefining the Age of
Criminality, 38 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 143, 156 (2014).
103
Id. at 157.
104
Id.
105
See Corriero, supra note 5, at 1415.
106
Ellie D. Shefi, Note, Waiving Goodbye: Incarcerating Waived Juveniles
in Adult Correctional Facilities Will Not Reduce Crime, 36 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 653, 654 (2003).
107
See Charles & Zuccarelli, supra note 1, at 728–30.
108
See GOV’S COMM’N RECOMMENDATIONS FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE
REFORM, supra note 22, at 10, 15.
109
Id. at 10.
110
Id.
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over Juvenile Offenders—juveniles aged thirteen to fifteen who
commit designated felony offenses.111 Criminal court also has
original jurisdiction over all adults—persons sixteen years and
older who commit a criminal offense or violation.112
A defendant’s designation—as a PINS, Juvenile Delinquent,
Juvenile Offender, or Adult—affects jurisdiction, which in turn
affects adjustment opportunities, detention facilities, confinement
facilities, and whether the defendant retains a criminal record.113 A
juvenile processed through the family court system may benefit
from “adjustment”—diversion of the juvenile’s case from the
prosecutor’s office to the Department of Probation.114 First, the
juvenile and his parental guardian meet with a probation officer to
determine if the juvenile’s case is eligible.115 If all parties select
adjustment as an appropriate measure, the juvenile may participate
in rehabilitative programs in lieu of prosecution.116 According to
recent studies, thirty-eight percent or more of cases processed in
family court are selected for adjustment.117
The Department of Probation considers a number of factors in
making an adjustment determination, including the gravity of the
offense and the juvenile’s likelihood of re-offending.118 If a
juvenile’s case is not selected for adjustment, it is referred to a
specialized juvenile prosecutor.119 The prosecutorial process
includes a “mandatory investigation by the probation department
into the academic, emotional, social, and familial background” of
the juvenile.120 Both the prosecutor and the court utilize this
information to determine the appropriate punishment or remedial
measure for the juvenile.121 In accordance with the Family Court
Act, disposition of a juvenile’s case requires the court to “order the
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121

Id.
Id.
Id.
Schreibersdorf, supra note 22, at 1146.
Id.
Id. at 1146–47.
Id. at 1147.
Id. at 1146 n.12.
Id. at 1146.
Id. at 1147.
Id.
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least restrictive” means deemed “consistent with the needs and best
interests of the respondent and the need for protection of the
community.”122 This sentencing requirement affords the court wide
latitude to consider the best interests of the child and community,
in light of a holistic assessment of both the juvenile and his
offense.
The sealing provision is arguably the most advantageous
benefit of family court adjudication.123 Juvenile proceedings in
family court are sealed, which ensures that as a juvenile transitions
into adulthood, his educational, employment, and housing
opportunities are not stunted by youth offenses.124 In contrast,
criminal court adjudication of sixteen-year-olds, seventeen-yearolds, and Juvenile Offenders affords no automatic sealing
provision.125 For these juveniles, designation as a Youthful
Offender is the only opportunity for a sealed record.126 As
discussed in Part I, Youthful Offender status “provides the
opportunity for any youth under the age of 19 to have a criminal
conviction substituted with a noncriminal adjudication at
sentencing.”127 Youthful Offender status is mandatory for juveniles
under age nineteen who are convicted of a misdemeanor with no
prior convictions or Youthful Offender determinations.128
Otherwise, a Youthful Offender determination is discretionary.129
Moreover, juveniles convicted of Class A felonies are prohibited
from Youthful Offender status.130 In New York, approximately
“1,600 juveniles per year are saddled with criminal records that
create[] barriers to success for the rest of their lives.”131
122

N.Y. F AM . C T . A CT § 352.2 (McKinney 2014).
Schreibersdorf, supra note 22, at 1148.
124
Id.
125
GOV.’S COMM’N RECOMMENDATIONS FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM,
supra note 22, at 134.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id. at 134 n.536.
131
Andrew M. Cuomo, Opportunity Agenda: 2015 State of the State 279
(2015),
available
at
https://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/governor.ny.gov/files/atoms/files/2015_Opp
123
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PINS and Juvenile Delinquents processed in family court are
detained pre-trial and confined post-trial in a juvenile facility132
that often resembles a group home.133 A Juvenile Offender
processed in criminal court is detained pre-trial in a secure youth
facility and confined post-trial in an Office of Children and Family
Services (OCFS) secure center. Juveniles age sixteen and older are
detained pre-trial and confined post-trial in adult correctional
facilities—either county jails or prisons.134 Juvenile and adult
correctional facilities differ in numerous ways, including services
and population.135 Adult prisons employ approximately one teacher
for every one hundred inmates and one security staff member for
every four inmates.136 Juvenile facilities employ one teacher per
every fifteen residents and one custodial or monitoring staff
member per every eleven residents.137 In terms of counseling, adult
prisons employ one medical staff member for every twenty-five
inmates—with the term medical staff describing a broad category
of medical and technical staff that includes counselors. Two-thirds
of juvenile facilities employ one counselor for every ten
residents.138
In adult facilities, inmates generally have greater size and
strength, more extensive criminal histories, and more experience
with incarceration than juveniles housed in juvenile facilities.139
While approximately fifty-three percent of adult prison inmates in
ortunity_Agenda_Book.pdf.
132
New York’s juvenile detention facilities have received harsh criticism
for “intolerable conditions.” See Newman, supra note 6, at 1264 (“The U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ) investigated four New York juvenile detention
facilities and issued a report in August 2009 finding that juveniles held in
confinement were regularly being abused, severely injured, and deprived of
constitutional rights.”).
133
See GOV.’S COMM’N RECOMMENDATIONS FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE
REFORM, supra note 22, at 10; Schreibersdorf, supra note 22, at 1148.
134
See GOV.’S COMM’N RECOMMENDATIONS FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE
REFORM, supra note 22, at 10; Schreibersdorf, supra note 22, at 1148.
135
Donna M. Bishop, Juvenile Offenders in the Adult Criminal Justice
System, 27 CRIME & JUST. 81, 139–40 (2000).
136
Id. at 140.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id. at 139.
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state facilities are violent offenders,140 approximately thirty-three
percent of juveniles in juvenile detention facilities are violent
offenders.141 In summary, juveniles incarcerated in adult
correctional facilities have less access to education and health
programs and are exposed to older, stronger, more violent, and
more seasoned offenders.
III. RAISING
YORK

THE

AGE

OF

CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY

IN

NEW

During the past fifteen years, the scientific community has
developed a wealth of research demonstrating that juveniles have
both reduced culpability for criminal conduct and greater capacity
for rehabilitation.142 This capacity for positive change is
squandered when juveniles are prosecuted as adults. Juveniles
prosecuted as adults retain a criminal record, which can cripple
their education, employment, and housing opportunities.143
Juveniles incarcerated with adults are at heightened risk for
emotional abuse, sexual abuse, and criminal socialization.144
Moreover, juveniles incarcerated with adults have limited access to
educational and rehabilitative programs, which further hinders
successful societal reintegration post-incarceration.145 Empirical
studies of juveniles sentenced as adults conclude that adult
sentencing has no deterrent effect on juvenile crime and in fact
increases recidivism.146 Taken in sum, prosecuting juveniles as
140

The Sentencing Project, Fact Sheet: Trends in U.S. Corrections 4
(2011), available at http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_Trends_
in_Corrections_Fact_sheet.pdf.
141
CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, Facts: Youth in the Justice System 2
(last updated April 2012), available at http://www.campaignfor
youthjustice.org/documents/KeyYouthCrimeFacts.pdf.
142
See Taylor-Thompson, supra note 102, at 158–59.
143
Corriero, supra note 5, at 1419.
144
See Wood, supra note 21, at 1450–51; JAILING JUVENILES, supra note
20, at 4.
145
See Wood, supra note 21, at 1454.
146
See Robert Anthonsen, Note, Furthering the Goal of Juvenile
Rehabilitation, 13 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 729, 741 (2010) (discussing two
studies that concluded that the adult prosecution of juveniles in New York and
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A. Scientific Research Regarding Juvenile
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Brain

U.S. Supreme Court decisions in the last ten years reflect the
Court’s understanding that “adolescents are unfinished products,
developmentally and morally” and “that these factors hold
constitutional significance.”147 The Court has invalidated, on
Eighth Amendment grounds, the following sentences for juveniles:
capital punishment for those less than eighteen years of age,148 life
sentence without parole for non-homicide convictions,149 and
mandatory life sentences for those convicted of homicide.150 In
reaching these decisions, the Court focused on “three significant
gaps between children and adults” that reduce the juvenile’s
culpability, including the juvenile’s (1) underdeveloped sense of
responsibility, which leads to impulsive and reckless decisions, (2)
inability to remove himself from negative influences and
vulnerability to such negative influences and pressures, and (3)
underdeveloped moral character, which indicates that his actions
do not necessarily exemplify permanent depravity.151 The Court
supported its conclusions, in part, with scientific research
regarding juvenile brain structure and social science research
regarding juvenile behavior.152
Scientific studies of the brain regions associated with
emotional impulses and impulse control conclude that adolescent
brains are more active than adult brains in regions controlling
aggression and fear, and less active than adult brains in areas
controlling risk assessment and impulse control regions.153 This
Idaho produced no deterrent effect on juvenile crimes rates and two studies that
concluded that New York and Florida juveniles prosecuted as adults are more
likely to reoffend).
147
Taylor-Thompson, supra note 102, at 146 (discussing the Supreme
Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468 (2012)).
148
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
149
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 81 (2010).
150
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012).
151
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464; Hummel, supra note 36, at 278.
152
Taylor-Thompson, supra note 102, at 163.
153
AMA Brief, supra note 26, at *12.
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research demonstrates that juveniles are less culpable than adults
for their actions.
It is impossible to understand the differences between juvenile
and adult criminal responsibility without first examining key
scientific aspects of the brain. The limbic system serves as the
brain’s emotional center,154 within which sits the neural system
known as the amygdala.155 The amygdala is often associated with
aggressive and impulsive behavior, as it has evolved to produce
fight or flight responses to danger.156 The frontal lobes, by
contrast, are associated with emotional regulation and response
inhibition.157 More specifically, “complex information-processing
functions such as perception, thinking, and reasoning”158 occur in
the neocortex and “the prefrontal cortex is associated with . . .
decision making, risk assessment, ability to judge future
consequences, evaluating reward and punishment, behavioral
inhibition, impulse control, deception, responses to positive and
negative feedback, and making moral judgment.”159 Recent
developments in brain imaging demonstrate that adolescents have
highly active limbic systems and less active frontal lobes.160 As
adolescents mature, brain activity gradually shifts from the
amygdala to the frontal lobes.161 Thus, until critical brain
development is complete, the impulse-controlling frontal lobe

154

Id. at *12 (citing Daniel J. Siegel, THE DEVELOPING MIND: TOWARD A
NEUROBIOLOGY OF INTERPERSONAL EXPERIENCE, 10 (Guilford Press 1999)).
155
Id.
156
Id. at *12–13 (citing Abigail A. Baird et al., Functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging of Facial Affect Recognition in Children and Adolescents,
38 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 1, 1 (1999)).
157
Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., In Vivo Evidence for Post-Adolescent Brain
Maturation in Frontal and Striatal Regions, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 859, 860
(1999).
158
AMA Brief, supra note 26, at *13–14 (quoting D ANIEL J. S IEGEL, THE
DEVELOPING MIND: TOWARD A NEUROBIOLOGY OF INTERPERSONAL
EXPERIENCE, 10 (Guilford Press 1999)).
159
Id. at *13–14.
160
Id. at *15.
161
Id. (citing K. Rubia et al., Functional Frotalisation with Age: Mapping
Neurodevelopmental Trajectories with fMRI, 24 NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAV.
REVS. 13 (2000)).
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“exerts less control” over the amygdala.162 Neurological research
suggests that this critical brain development continues until the
early twenties.163 Behavioral scientists have long described
juveniles as emotionally volatile, impulsive, and poor evaluators of
risk assessment.164 Brain imaging technology now accounts for
these traits and the juvenile’s ability to outgrow them, which
demonstrates that juveniles are less culpable than adults for their
criminal actions.165
Brain imaging has also confirmed that adolescent brains are
structurally underdeveloped in regions relating to reasoning and
impulse control.166 The prefrontal cortex remains structurally
immature throughout adolescence, because both myelination and
pruning are incomplete.167 Myelin, a fatty white substance,
insulates neural fibers that use electrical impulses to relay
information.168 “The presence of myelin makes communications
between different parts of the brain faster and more reliable” and
the development of myelin continues throughout adolescence.169
The presence of myelin is a sign of brain maturity and myelination
in the frontal cortex—the risk assessment and impulse control
center—continues until late adolescence.170 Neuroscience research
162

Id.
Anthonsen, supra note 146, at 744 (citing K EN C. W INTERS, M ENTOR
F OUNDATION , A DOLESCENT B RAIN D EVELOPMENT AND D RUG A BUSE 4
(2008)).
164
AMA Brief, supra note 26, at *11.
165
See Taylor-Thompson, supra note 102, at 189–90 (“So, as neurological
and behavioral science demonstrates, a typical fourteen-year-old will have an
underdeveloped sense of self and underdeveloped cognitive and emotional
controls that will lead her to submit to peer pressure and engage in thrillseeking, often criminal conduct. But those actions, no matter how dangerous, do
not indicate that she is either irretrievably depraved or fundamentally flawed.
She, fortunately, will continue to develop and will mature out of offending.”).
166
AMA Brief, supra note 26, at *16.
167
Id. at *17.
168
Id.
169
Id. at *16 (quoting E LKHONON G OLDBERG , THE EXECUTIVE BRAIN:
FRONTAL LOBES & THE CIVILIZED MIND 144 (2001).
170
See Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., Mapping Cortical Change Across the
Human Life Span, 6 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 309, 311–12 (2003) (using high
resolution structural MRI to study gray matter density in individuals ages seven
163
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suggests that immature myelination contributes to adolescent
immaturity, and that the increased white matter in adult brains
affords the “cognitive complexity” that facilitates impulse
control.171
Pruning, like myelination, is crucial to brain maturity and also
occurs late into adolescence.172 Pruning is a process by which gray
matter—brain cells responsible for frontal lobe tasks—is
decreased.173 Pruning both establishes and extinguishes neural
pathways, improving the overall functioning of the frontal lobes.174
Thus, “[o]ne of the last areas of the brain to reach full maturing, as
measured by pruning, is the part associated with regulating
behavior, stifling impulses, assessing risks, and moral
reasoning.”175 This research holds profound significance for
adolescents’ responsibility for their actions, even when such
actions are criminal. To expect juveniles to demonstrate the
judgment or impulse control of adults is to expect them “to
transcend their own psychological [and] biological capacities.”176
B. Harms of Treating Adolescent Offenders as Adults
In light of the scientific research demonstrating juvenile
capacity for rehabilitation, the adult prosecution and incarceration
of New York’s juveniles is all the more tragic. Juveniles
incarcerated with adults are at increased risk for sexual abuse,
depression, and criminal socialization,177 and have limited access
to eighty-seven and finding, among other things, that “the trajectory of
maturational and aging effects varied considerably over the cortex,” with
myelination continuing into adulthood in the frontal neocortices).
171
Taylor-Thompson, supra note 102, at 187.
172
AMA Brief, supra note 26, at *19. See also Winters, supra note 163, at
4 (explaining that pruning is essential “for more efficient and faster informationprocessing” and that the areas of the brain associated with “reasoning and
judgment are developing well into the early to mid 20s”).
173
AMA Brief, supra note 26, at *19.
174
Id. See also Winters, supra note 163, at 4.
175
AMA Brief, supra note 26, at *20.
176
Id.
177
Wood, supra note 21, at 1450–51; JAILING JUVENILES, supra note 20, at
4.
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to age-appropriate mental health, physical health, and educational
services.178 In addition, juveniles prosecuted as adults retain a
criminal record, which can cripple their education, employment,
and housing opportunities.179 As a result of these impediments to
reintegration, adolescents processed in criminal court continue
cycling through the criminal justice system.180
1. Harms Suffered by Juveniles in Adult Prisons and
Jails
Juveniles incarcerated in adult facilities are at high risk for
sexual victimization.181 Juveniles who are underdeveloped
“physically, cognitively, socially, or emotionally, are less capable
of protecting themselves from sexual advances and assault.”182
Sexual abuse often begins within forty-eight hours of a juvenile’s
incarceration in an adult facility.183 Juveniles in adult facilities “are
five times more likely to be sexually assaulted” than their
counterparts in juvenile detention centers.184 In 2005, though
juveniles accounted for less than one percent of the jail population,
they were victims in twenty-one percent of substantiated inmateon-inmate sexual violence.185
Sexual abuse and rape have emotional and psychological
consequences, such as depression and posttraumatic stress
disorder.186 “Juveniles who have been sexually abused may face
problems with anger, impulse control, flashbacks, dissociative
episodes, hopelessness, despair, and persistent distrust and
withdrawal.”187 In addition, sexual assault and rape exposes
178

Wood, supra note 21, at 1454.
Corriero, supra note 5, at 1415.
180
See Roxanna Asgarian, The Two Sides of Raise the Age in New York,
JUVENILE JUSTICE INFORMATION EXCHANGE (July 7, 2014), http://jjie.org/thetwo-sides-of-raise-the-age-in-new-york/.
181
JAILING JUVENILES, supra note 20, at 4.
182
Wood, supra note 21, at 1453.
183
Id. at 1450–51.
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Id. at 1451.
185
JAILING JUVENILES, supra note 20, at 4.
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Id.
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Id.
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victims to sexually transmitted infections, such as HIV/AIDS and
hepatitis.188 In the United States, HIV and AIDS rates are five
times higher among the prison population.189
To protect teens from adult inmates, prison staff often resort to
housing teens in solitary confinement.190 Though this measure
eliminates the physical and emotional harms that result from teen
contact with adult inmates, prolonged isolation merely substitutes
one harm for another. “Even limited exposure to [solitary
confinement] can cause anxiety, paranoia, exacerbate existing
mental disorders, and increase risk of suicide.”191 Juveniles
incarcerated in adult jails are thirty-six times more likely to
commit suicide than juveniles in a juvenile detention facility.192
Teens incarcerated with adults are also susceptible to criminal
socialization, by which they develop familiarity and comfort with
criminal behavior and networks.193 To assimilate into inmate
culture and mask their vulnerability, incarcerated teens may
engage in violent behavior.194 Juveniles incarcerated in adult
facilities are “more likely to learn social rules and norms that
legitimate[] domination, exploitation, and retaliation.”195
Incarceration with adult offenders facilitates a criminal education,
where teens learn techniques for performing criminal acts and
avoiding detection.196 As a result, this socialization can transform a
juvenile into a career criminal.197 Given the scientific research
demonstrating juvenile malleability and capacity for positive
growth,198 the criminal socialization of juveniles is all the more
tragic.
188
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JAILING JUVENILES, supra note 20, at 4.
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Wood, supra note 21, at 1450.
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Id. at 1451, 1456.
195
Joseph, supra note 30, at 230 (quoting Donna Bishop & Charles Frazier,
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237, 263 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin Zimring eds., 2000)).
196
Wood, supra note 21, at 1455–56.
197
See id.
198
Get the Facts, supra note 6.
189

A PROGRESSIVE STATE OF MIND

871

While juvenile detention facilities offer rehabilitative and
educational programs to support detainees, adult facilities have
limited access to age-appropriate mental health, physical health,
and educational services.199 Adult facilities, which are not designed
for juvenile care, “may fail to provide juveniles with the
appropriate nutrition or dental and vision care, which are especially
critical for developing adolescents.”200 In addition, most
incarcerated juveniles have not completed their high school
education, and imprisonment in an adult facility limits their ability
to do so.201 A Bureau of Justice Assistance survey found that forty
percent of adult jails provided no education services and only
eleven percent provided special education services.202 In contrast,
the Department of Justice’s 2010 Juvenile Residential Facility
Census reported that ninety-two percent of juvenile facilities
offered educational services to some or all residents.203
2. Adult Sentencing of Juveniles Neither Reduces
Juvenile Crime Rates Nor Prevents Recidivism
Studies assessing the deterrent effect of prosecuting juveniles
as adults conclude that the threat of adult sanctions has no
deterrent effect on juvenile crime.204 One study assessed the effect
of New York’s Juvenile Offender Law on juvenile crime rates by
analyzing the number of juvenile arrests that occurred during the
four years preceding the legislation and six years subsequent to
it.205 The researchers compared New York juvenile crime rates to
the rates of two control groups, which included Philadelphia youth
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Wood, supra note 21, at 1454–55.
Id. at 1455.
201
Id. at 1454–55.
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SARAH HOCKENBERRY ET AL., JUVENILE RESIDENTIAL FACILITY
CENSUS, 2010: SELECTED FINDINGS, NATIONAL REPORT SERIES 1 (2013),
available at http://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/241134.pdf.
204
See Anthonsen, supra note 146, at 741–42.
205
Id. at 741 (discussing Simon I. Singer & David McDowall,
Criminalizing Delinquency: The Deterrent Effects of the New York Juvenile
Offender Law, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 521, 521–35 (1998)).
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offenders and older New York offenders.206 They concluded “that
the threat or use of adult criminal sentencing had no effect on the
levels of serious juvenile crime.”207 A second study, evaluating the
deterrent effect of Idaho’s 1981 juvenile transfer statute, reached
the same conclusion.208 Researchers compared juvenile arrest rates
during the five years preceding the legislation and five years
subsequent to it, concluding the legislation had no deterrent effect
on juvenile crime.209
A third study assessed the effect of New York’s Juvenile
Offender Law on juvenile recidivism.210 The study analyzed the
recidivism rates of 800 fifteen- and sixteen-year-olds.211 The
sample set included 400 juvenile robbery offenders and 400
juvenile burglary offenders, selected from two New Jersey
counties and two New York counties.212 In accordance with the
New York Juvenile Offender Law, the New York juvenile cases
originated in criminal court.213 In contrast, the New Jersey juvenile
cases originated in the juvenile justice system, with the option for
waiver to adult criminal court.214 The study concluded that both
conviction rates and sanction severity were higher for juveniles in
the criminal court system.215 For burglary offenders, court
jurisdiction did not affect the recidivism rate.216 For robbery,
206
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however, offenders processed in criminal court had re-arrest rates
fifty percent higher than offenders processed in juvenile court.217
This increased recidivism rate suggests that public safety was
compromised, rather than promoted, by the criminal court
adjudication of juveniles.218 The outcomes of these studies suggest
that charging New York’s juveniles as adults does not reduce
recidivism and thus the “subjection of the youthful criminal to ‘just
desserts’ is merely a placebo for the public’s fear.”219
3. Adult Sentencing Inhibits Successful Reintegration
Into Society
Adolescents prosecuted as adults retain a criminal record,
which can cripple their education, employment, and housing
opportunities.220 As a result of these impediments to reintegration,
adolescents processed in criminal court continue “cycling back
through the [criminal justice] system.”221
As discussed in Parts II and III, juveniles incarcerated in adult
facilities face educational barriers, which hinder their ability to
complete high school or obtain a GED.222 After incarceration, only
one-third of young adults in New York complete their education.223
Without a high school diploma, these juveniles are more likely to
be unemployed and require public assistance.224 For those
juveniles who complete high school, opportunities for higher
education are diminished due to their criminal history.225
According to a recent survey, “66% percent of the responding
colleges collect criminal justice information.”226 Juveniles
217
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convicted as adults maintain a criminal record, and thus are
required to disclose their criminal history to interested colleges.227
In addition, college financing for these juveniles is almost
impossible given that prospective students with a criminal
conviction have limited access to federal student aid loans.228
Juveniles with criminal records also face impediments to
securing both private and public housing. In New York, property
owners may decline an application due to the applicant’s criminal
record.229 Moreover, the New York City Housing Authority
screens all applicants over sixteen for a criminal record—a policy
that gravely impacts a youth offender’s family.230 “The family is
deemed ineligible for public housing for prescribed periods of time
after the convicted person has served his/her sentence,” which
includes probation, parole, and/or payment of a fine.231 The period
of ineligibility is determined based upon the severity of the
underlying offense.232 A person convicted of a Class B
misdemeanor is ineligible for public housing for three years after
completing probation or parole.233 This three-year housing sanction
for misdemeanor offenders is comparatively severe, considering
the maximum sentence of imprisonment for any misdemeanor is
only one year.234 A person convicted of a Class A, B, or C felony
is ineligible for public housing for six years.235
In addition to the physical barriers noted above, juveniles who
are sentenced as adults may suffer psychological consequences that
delay their reintegration post-incarceration. Research has identified
“desistance from crime with adult maturation,” which juveniles
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achieve in part by “engaging in age-appropriate behavior.”236 In
essence, in order to grow-out of their criminal activity, juveniles
need the opportunity to grow-up with their age cohort.237 Juveniles
sentenced as adults experience disrupted education and
employment.238 Thus, “juveniles punished as adults are behind
their age cohort in meeting the adulthood markers of marriage,
full-time employment, school completion, and independent
residency.”239
PROPOSED CHANGES
SYSTEM

IV.

TO

NEW YORK’S JUVENILE JUSTICE

A. Youth Court Pilot Program and Senate Bill 7394
In 2012, New York Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman instituted a
youth court pilot program, which created “nine adolescent
diversion parts” across New York State, and “promote[s] noncriminal dispositions for 16- and 17-year-olds, including social
service interventions and community service, which could earn a
dismissal of charges.”240 Instituting this program required no
legislative action, instead building upon youth diversion programs
already established in certain local courts.241
Non-violent sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders are
eligible for participation in the pilot program.242 First, teens are
scheduled to meet with a probation officer for an adjustment
eligibility evaluation.243 During this evaluation, the probation
officer establishes conditions for adjustment, such as restitution
and/or participation in a community service program.244 If the teen
236
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complies with the mandated conditions, criminal charges will not
be filed.245 If, however, the teen fails to meet the mandated
requirements, he will appear before a judge trained in adolescent
behavior.246
Where adjustment is either not offered or is unsuccessful, the
juvenile’s case proceeds to arraignment and adjudication.247
Benefits of the youth court include additional rights not available
in family court, such as bail and trial by jury.248 Once a verdict is
reached, the youth court judge has discretion “to craft the ‘least
restrictive’ available disposition consistent with the ‘needs and best
interests’ of the youth[] and the ‘need for protection of the
community’—a more lenient standard than that for adults under
the Penal Law.”249
Though the youth court pilot program is a progressive step in
dismantling New York’s outdated juvenile justice system, the
protection it affords extends only to juveniles accused of nonviolent crimes.250 Therefore, juveniles who commit violent crimes
and are arguably most in need of youth court’s rehabilitative
opportunities are unable to reap its benefits. Children are
unfinished products, capable of positive change—“the immaturity
and plasticity that create an increased propensity for wrongdoing in
adolescents also provide an enormous capacity for learning,
development, and growth.”251 A juvenile’s offense, no matter how
egregious, does not limit this capacity for growth. Given juvenile
malleability, they deserve every opportunity for rehabilitation.
The youth court pilot program serves as a “testing ground” for
Judge Lippman’s legislative proposal and provides a mechanism
for immediately addressing the juvenile justice system’s defects
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until new legislation is approved.252 New York State Senator Steve
Saland presented Judge Lippman’s legislative proposal to the New
York State Legislature as Senate Bill 7394 (2012).253 In addition to
creating the youth court pilot program, the bill proposed changes to
the Criminal Procedure Law, the Penal Law, the Executive Law,
and the Judiciary Law.254 It proposed revising the Criminal
Procedure Law to include a section devoted to sixteen- and
seventeen-year-old offenders.255 This section required a myriad of
procedural safeguards, such as parental notification at arrest,
release of the adolescent offender into a guardian’s custody, and
prohibition against releasing the adolescent’s fingerprints to a
federal depository.256 In addition to amending the Criminal
Procedure Law, Senate Bill 7394 revised Penal Law section 30.00
by raising the age of criminal responsibility to eighteen years
old.257
Senate Bill 7394 was referred to the Codes Committee of the
New York State Senate, after which the bill failed to progress
further.258 The Bill was reintroduced in the 2013 session as Senate
Bill 4489 and again was referred to the Codes Committee.259 At
this time, no further movement has occurred.260 Though there is no
definitive explanation for the failure of these bills to progress,261
counties and various state departments expressed concern over
increased costs.262
B. Senate Bill 7020
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In a separate attempt to raise the age of criminality in New
York, Senator Velmanette Montgomery introduced Senate Bill
7020 during the 2012 session.263 Senate Bill 7020 proposed raising
the age of criminal responsibility to eighteen years old, permitting
juvenile detention centers to house all adolescents under eighteen,
and raising the maximum age for Youthful Offender Status from
nineteen to twenty years old.264
One important feature of Senate Bill 7020 is that it made no
distinction between violent and non-violent juveniles.265 Senate
Bill 7020 authorized family court to adjudicate violent felony cases
involving sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds.266 Though criminal
court retained original jurisdiction over juveniles charged with
designated felonies, the court could remove these cases to family
court without authorization by the district attorney.267 Senate Bills
7020 and 7394 ultimately faced the same fate—referral to the
Codes Committee where all progress ceased.268 Senate Bill 7020
was re-introduced in the 2013 legislative session as Senate Bill
1409, where it was again referred to the Codes Committee.269
C. Governor’s Commission on Youth, Public Safety, and
Justice’s Proposal
On April 9, 2014, Governor Cuomo issued Executive Order
131 establishing the Commission on Youth, Public Safety, and
Justice.270 The Commission was tasked to “(a) develop a plan to
raise the age of juvenile jurisdiction, and (b) make [a]
recommendation as to how New York’s justice system can
improve outcomes for youth while promoting community
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safety.”271 On January 19, 2015, the Commission released its
comprehensive 163-page report.272 A non-exhaustive list of the
report’s topics includes: the evolution of juvenile reform in New
York State; best practices in juvenile justice; the upper and lower
ages of delinquency jurisdiction across the United States; recent
reforms raising the age of criminal responsibility in other states;
arrest and diversion processes; court processes for sixteen- and
seventeen-year-olds and younger offenders; pretrial and post-trial
confinement of juveniles; harms of incarcerating juveniles in adult
facilities; juvenile disposition services and facilities; juvenile reentry post-incarceration; the consequences for juveniles with a
criminal record; and the projected impact on case processing if
New York were to raise the age of the criminal responsibility.273
In addition to summarizing and analyzing juvenile justice
processes, the report puts forth thirty-eight procedural and
legislative recommendations for reform.274 Consistent with the
proposals discussed above, the report recommends raising the age
of juvenile jurisdiction to eighteen.275 The report recommends
raising the lower threshold of juvenile jurisdiction to age twelve,
excluding homicide offenses.276 The recommended lower age
threshold for juvenile homicide offenders is ten years old.277 The
report also recommends expanding family court jurisdiction to
sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds charged with non-violent
felonies, disorderly conduct violations, misdemeanors, and
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harassment.278 Under this scheme, the criminal court system would
retain original jurisdiction over “current Juvenile Offender crimes,
as well as all violent felony offenses; all homicide offenses; Class
A felonies; crimes of terrorism; felony vehicular assaults;
aggravated criminal contempt; and conspiracy to commit any of
these offenses and tampering with a witness related to any of these
offenses.”279
The report also recommends creating youth parts within the
criminal court system.280 However, unlike Judge Lippman’s youth
court proposal, these youth parts would have jurisdiction over all
sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders, as well as younger
offenders designated as Juvenile Offenders.281 Given that this
proposal mandates family court adjudication for certain sixteenand seventeen-year-old offenders and criminal court adjudication
for other sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders, the specially
trained youth part judges would be vested with concurrent criminal
court and family court jurisdiction.282 In addition, the Commission
recommends extending Youthful Offender status to nineteen and
twenty-year-olds (currently Youthful Offender eligibility is limited
to juveniles under nineteen years old).283 Finally, regardless of
family court or criminal court jurisdiction, the proposed reform
prohibits confinement of any juvenile in an adult jail or prison and
permits juveniles to remain in youth facilities until age twentyone.284 This particular recommendation is extremely progressive,
and reflects the documentation of the harms suffered by juveniles
in adult facilities.
The Commission’s reforms are arguably the most progressive
in the nation, extending family court protections to a larger age
cohort and a more expansive list of offenses.285 Following the
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report’s release, New York State Bar President Glenn Lau-Kee
voiced the association’s support for raising the age of criminal
responsibility:
Every child accused of a nonviolent felony deserves
a second chance . . . . Research demonstrates—what
parents intuitively know—that 16 and 17-year-old
kids lack the maturity and judgment to understand
the legal consequences of their actions. A criminal
record at a young age can shadow a lifetime,
affecting an individual’s future education and
employment. Raising the age of criminal
responsibility will help all children to embark on a
more positive path to adulthood. Providing troubled
teenagers with support and guidance can help them
turn around their lives.286
Lau-Kee’s statement echoes the underlying tenor of the
Commission’s recommendations, and contains the same
contradiction as well. Lau-Kee states that juveniles lack judgment
to appreciate the legal consequences of their actions and discusses
how the burden of a criminal record prevents juveniles from
breaking the criminal mold.287 In making these particular
statements, Lee-Kau includes no qualifiers—he speaks of all
children.288 Yet, when he discusses which juveniles should benefit
from the proposed reforms, he limits his scope to children accused
of nonviolent felonies.289 While the proposed reforms are a critical
step toward providing juveniles access to crucial rehabilitative
opportunities and assisting juveniles in successful re-entry postincarceration,290 juveniles who commit the most egregious of
offenses are denied access to these benefits.
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS
This Note’s proposal is comprised of four parts.291 First, the
age of criminality in New York should be raised from sixteen to
eighteen years old. Second, New York should establish a separate
youth court to adjudicate all cases involving sixteen- and
seventeen-year-olds, and all designated felonies committed by
thirteen-, fourteen-, and fifteen-year-olds. Third, New York should
eliminate any provisions permitting the transfer of juveniles from
family court to adult criminal court. Finally, district attorneys
should have discretion to permit reverse waiver from criminal
court to youth court for select cases involving eighteen- to twentyone-year-olds.
First, the New York State Legislature should amend the Family
Court Act to increase the age of criminal responsibility from
sixteen to eighteen years old.292 Research demonstrates that the
adolescent brain is underdeveloped, which limits adolescent
capacity for decision making, impulse control, and reasoning. This
research suggests that adolescent offenders are less culpable than
their adult counterparts, and that their youth should therefore be
considered in the adjudication process. In addition, this research
291
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demonstrates that adolescent brains are still developing and thus
are receptive to rehabilitative interventions. Raising the age of
criminal responsibility is the first step in reclaiming New York’s
lost youth.
Second, within the family court system, the New York State
Legislature should designate a separate youth court tasked with
adjudicating offenses committed by (1) all sixteen- and seventeenyear-olds, and (2) all thirteen-, fourteen-, and fifteen-year-old
designated felony offenders. Family court provisions—including
adjustment, sealing, and sentencing that considers both the best
interests of the child and the community—would be extended to
youth court. This youth court would have jurisdiction over these
cohorts, regardless of offense severity. Though sixteen- and
seventeen-year-olds are juveniles, their cognitive abilities are
generally more developed than younger offenders, making their
criminal culpability less than adults’ but greater than younger
offenders’.293 These juveniles should be prosecuted in a court
designed to recognize their education, psychological maturity,
mental health, and family life. In addition, this youth court would
have original jurisdiction over thirteen-, fourteen-, and fifteenyear-olds who commit designated felony acts. Youth court is the
appropriate venue for these young offenders because of its more
stringent sentencing capabilities, discussed below, and greater
familiarity with violent offenses.
Youth court sentencing guidelines should include more
stringent measures than those available to family court judges.294
This would account for the increased age of offenders and the
increased severity of offenses. Youth court judges would
appropriately consider the adolescents’ mental development and
culpability in determining the sentence. In addition, any sentence
requiring incapacitation would be served in a secure juvenile
facility rather than an adult prison. If a juvenile is sentenced to a
293
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prison term that extends beyond his twenty-first birthday, the
remainder of his sentence would be served in an adult facility.
Though family court is not the appropriate venue for these
adolescent offenders, neither is adult criminal court. Youth court’s
ability to impose strict sentences would assuage “public critique
that juvenile courts are too lenient”295 while ensuring that
adolescents are adjudicated in a court developed specifically for
their age group.
Third, the New York State Legislature should eliminate
transfer from family court to criminal court, in order to ensure that
family court or youth court retains jurisdiction over all juveniles.296
Both family court and youth court conduct a holistic assessment of
the youth and his offense, and then determine the least restrictive
disposition available consistent with society’s needs and the
offender’s needs.297 Criminal court does not have this discretion.
As a result of criminal court adjudication, adolescents are
incarcerated in adult facilities with limited access to ageappropriate mental health, physical health, and educational
services.298 Adolescents in adult facilities are at greater risk for
sexual victimization and suicide.299 After their incarceration, these
adolescent offenders face significant barriers to education,
employment, and housing.300 Moreover, research suggests that
adult sanctions neither deter youth offenders nor decrease
recidivism.301 For these reasons, the New York State Legislature
should eliminate transfer provisions from family court to criminal
court.
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Fourth, the legislature should permit waiver to youth court for
select eighteen- to twenty-one-year-olds.302 Scientific research
suggests that brain development continues until at least age
twenty-four.303 Unavoidably, the age delineation in youth court’s
original jurisdiction is somewhat arbitrary—a person does not
wake up on his eighteenth birthday endowed with significantly
more knowledge, impulse control, and reasoning than he had the
day prior. Further, raising the age of criminality to eighteen is in
accordance with best practice across the United States.304
However, given the robust scientific research finding limitations in
eighteen- to twenty-one-year-olds’ impulse control and reasoning
skills, a district attorney or judge should have discretion to suggest
removal in appropriate cases. The district attorney would likely
utilize this discretion if the offender only recently turned eighteen
or if the offender exhibited developmental delays suggesting his
maturity level more closely matched that of a younger age cohort.
CONCLUSION
Gabrielle Horowitz-Prisco, Director of the Juvenile Justice
Project at the Corrections Association, stresses that “no one is
solely the worst thing they have ever done.”305 Though one person
may not be solely his worst act, New York’s paradigm entrenches
the state’s youngest offenders in a correctional system designed to
ensure that their first worst act is not their last. Sixteen- and
seventeen-year-olds face an uphill battle to overcome their juvenile
offenses.
Juvenile brains are underdeveloped in regions associated with
risk assessment, impulse control, and reasoning, and these regions
continue to mature into early adulthood.306 This research
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demonstrates that juveniles are both less culpable than adults and
more receptive to rehabilitative intervention.307 Juveniles should be
processed in a court that accounts for their diminished culpability
and capitalizes on their potential for positive growth. Moreover,
juvenile capacity for rehabilitation is squandered by juvenile
incarceration in adult facilities. Juveniles incarcerated in adult
prisons and jails have limited access to educational and
rehabilitative programs,308 and are at high risk for sexual
victimization, emotional abuse, depression, and criminal
socialization.309 In addition, the adult prosecution of juveniles has
no deterrent effect on juvenile crime rates and juveniles prosecuted
as adults are more likely to re-offend than juveniles prosecuted in
family court.310 This re-offending rate is unsurprising, given that a
criminal record severely limits one’s housing, education, and
employment opportunities.311
Proposed legislation, the youth court pilot program, and
recommendations from the Governor’s Commission are
progressive steps toward dismantling New York’s outdated
juvenile justice system, but they fall short by denying assistance to
New York’s most troubled juveniles. New York is prosecuting and
incarcerating juveniles at a time in their lives when they are most
responsive to rehabilitative intervention, and losing a precious
opportunity to turn troubled teens into productive members of
society. It is time for New York to raise the age of criminal
responsibility and embrace rehabilitative intervention for all youth,
regardless of the offense. Investing in New York’s juveniles is an
investment in the future. Sixteen is too young, and our resources
too vast, to concede hopelessness just yet.
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